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ABSTRACT
Ndembe, Elvis Mokake; M.S; Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics;
College of Achculture, Food Systems, and Natural Resources; North Dakota State
University; November 2007. Offsetting Behavior and the Benefits of Food Safety Policies
in Vegetable Preparation and Consumption. Major Professor: Dr. Dragan Miljkovic.
Foodbome disease outbreaks have a tremendous impact on society, including
foodbome illnesses, hospitalizations, lost work time, and deaths. These food-safety events
have a significant influence in shaping consumers' perception of risk. Outbreaks of
foodbome illnesses also have an effect on the development of public health policy.  Due to
these safety-related uncertainties in the food supply chain, various regulatory, safety, and
health policies are implemented to decrease harm to potential victims. The total effect of
such food-safety policies looked at in terms of reduction of foodbome illness, mortality,
and food-related diseases may possibly be smaller than the forecasted effect because of
failure to consider offsetting behavior. Attenuation and possibly reversal of the direct
policy effect on expected injuries may arise because of offsetting behavior.
This study combines both theoretical and empirical models to test the presence of
dominant or partial offsetting behavior (08) in the preparation and consumption of
vegetables if a food-safety policy such as the Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (PR/IIACCP) is mandated in the vegetable sector. Our findings
indicate that food-safety information that has an effect on outrage and locus of control,
both factors which have an effect on consumers' perception of risk, will lead consumers to
become lax in response to this food-safety policy.
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CHAPTI]R I
INTRODUCTION
Background Information on Offsetting Behavior
Food-safety related worries occur at all levels of the supply chain of food crops,
livestock, and related products: on-farm, in transportation systems, and in the course of
handling. These food-safety related uncertainties are responsible for numerous food recalls
(USDA, FSIS, 2001). For this reason, many regulatory, safety, and health policies are
adopted to reduce harm to potential victims from accidents and other harmful events. Some
regulatory economic studies have theoretically (Peltzman,  1975; Hause, 2006) and
empirically (Peterson and Hoffer,1994; Blomquist,1988) observed reductions, and in
some instances, reversal of direct policy effects on expected ham may occur because of
offsetting behavior (08) by potential victims. This increase in expected harm attributed to
decreased care by victims in response to the implemented policies is what has been termed
offsetting behavior. If the effect of offsetting behavior is overlooked, the expected outcome
of food-safety policy implementation will be misleading.
Most empirical studies undertaken thus far have focused their attention on issues
mostly related to traffic accidents (Lave and Weber,1970; Peltzman,1975), the effect of
health policies on the way of life-dependent disorders and death (Wilde,1994), and
workplace and consumer product accidents (Viscusi,1984a,1984b,1985,1992). In his
study of automobile safety regulations, Peltzman ( 1975) argued that improved automobile
safety regulations would lead to offsetting behavior by drivers, as such increasing the
probability of an accident, and possibly the expected accident loss. He suggested that the
enhancement in automobile occupant safety is entirely offset by the heightened danger to
non-occupants. Pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorcyclists could be at significantly higher
risk. Graham ( 1984) found drivers' behavioral response originating from an increase in
pedestrians-cyclist deaths which supports the suggestion advanced in Peltzman ( 1975).
Despite continuing argument about the popularity and magnitude of the offsetting
behavior effect, its existence is unquestionable. Notably, there was a 10% increase in head
injury from bicycle accidents witnessed between 1990 and 2000 despite the mandatory
implementation of bicycle helmets (Bames, 2001). Wearing helmets affects cyclists'
behavior (Hillman,1993). Cyclist wearing helmets might ride recklessly due to their
perception of increased safety consequently reducing or negating the benefits of helmet
utilization (Hillman,1993).
Helmet usage has been associated with increased number of neck injuries and fatalities
thereby decreasing some of the beneficial effects of its usage (Goldstein,1986). Factors
which increase the likelihood of a bicycle accident are associated with increases in the
likelihood of helmet use (Rodgers,1996).   Motorcycle riders encouraged to put on lielmets
might take greater risk in riding; which might increase both the gravity and possibility of
an accident occurring (Adarns,1983).
The majority of road improvements allow greater speed which could
counterbalance the associated safety improvements of the road (Wilde,1994; Assum ef cz/.,
1999). They observed that motorists drove faster with improved road conditions. Milton
and Mannering (1998) found out that increasing the number of lanes on a given road
segment might be responsible for the increase number of road accidents.
Keeler (1993) following research from Peltzman (1975) offered evidence that
policies aimed at lowering rural speed limits had no influence in reducing the number of
road fatalities. He attributed this non reduction in fatalities to offsetting behavior. Malialel
and Sztemfeld (1986) proposed that if drivers' perceptions caused them to underrate the
complexities related with the driving task, the outcome could be an upsurge in accidents.
Anti- lock brakes led to closer following in traffic by drivers putting them at a higher risk
of getting an accident (Sagberg ef a/,1997). They concluded that this was a manifestation
of riskier behavior by victims and drivers in the face of progress in safety. Evans (1996)
and Lund and O'Neill (1986) found evidence that accident reducing devices that provide
dynamic reaction mechanisms may influence drivers' actions thus increase the probability
of an accident. Rumar (1976) came out with the findings that drivers with studded tires
drove with higher speed.
Seat belt usage from seat-belt laws increases non vehicle occupant fatalities
(Garbacz,1990a,1992a). Garbacz (1992b) suggested that front seat belt laws put the
unbelted rear seat passenger at greater risk. He confirmed his suggestion by pointing to the
increase in rear-seat passenger fatalities in those states with front seat-belt laws. Evans and
Gral}arn, (1991 ) found evidence of offsetting behavior linked with the usage of seat belts.
They found out that mandatory seat belt use in fact increased the number of non vehicle
occupant deaths. They however concluded that the lifesaving effects of such regulation
overwhelm any risk to non-occupants. Offsetting behavior can reverse the results of any
improvement achieved by a safety habit. Calkins and Zlatoper (2001 ) found out that drivers
exhibited offsetting behavior in the form of increased driving speed and reckless driving
after a mandatory seat belt law was passed thereby increasing the potential for accidents
occurring.
Hoffer and Miller ( 1992) noticed an increase in the relative frequency of insurance
claims for 16 out of the 21  car models that had adopted airbags for the  1990 model year.
This increase in insurance claims and severity of collision was confirmed by Mimazari and
Henning (1999). They found out that there was a 4.6% increase in insurance and severity of
collision for air-bag equipped vehicles compared to those that had not adopted the airbag
technology. Vehicle lines that adopted airbags in 1990 and 1992 incuITed approximately 7
percent higher relative personal injury insurance claims in the initial year of airbag
adoption (Peterson cr tl/.,1995). The relative injury and absolute collision losses are never
lessened and usually worsen significantly for air-bag equipped cars relative to belt only
equipped cars after airbag adoption (Peterson and Hoffer,1994). Peterson and Hoffer
(1996) reported analogous results for a Highway Loss Data Institute Index of collision
frequency. They concluded that their results supported the idea that driver behavior
becomes more risky to compensate for a sense of improvement in vehicle safety.
Another example of offsetting behavior that has been proposed to arise from the
presence of an air bag is a decrease in seat belt use (Evans,1991). He proposed that under
the principle of "risk homeostasis" (Wilde,1982,1985,1988) a driver of an air bag
equipped vehicle may be willing to give up the additional benefit of a seat belt if he thinks
that an air bag provides a higher level of protection relative to that of a seat belt. Evans
( 1991 ) concluded that the driver may thus wrongfully presume that the air bag alone
provides an adequate level of protection. In their study of the effectiveness of the New
Jersey seat belt law, Asch e/ ¢/. (1991) found out that although injury severity declined,
accident occurrence increased significantly after the law was enacted. Chirinko and Harper
(1993) arrived at the same conclusion after replicating previous studies by Asch ef cl/.
( 1991 ). They also concluded that accidents tend to increase with improved automobile
safety regul ations.
Peterson, Hoffer, and Millner ( 1995) examined police accident reports for deadly
two-vehicle' accident involving an airbag equipped automobile occurring in Virginia in
1993. They came out with the findings that in 73 percent of such accidents, the air airbag-
equipped vehicle was found to be at fault. Relative injury claims experienced of particular
vehicle lines change when a model has been redesigned significantly or has incorporated a
major safety feature such as an airbag (Highway Loss Data Institute,1993b)
Despite its preponderance and existence in the automobile industry, offsetting
behavior also exist in other areas. Viscusi (1984a,1984b,1985,1992) proposed that people
may overestimate how safe a safety device is in mitigating accident risks by so doing, their
protective actions might diminish.   The probability of people leaving medicine containers
open after the initiation of safety caps has soared, bringing about an increase in child
poisoning from associated products (Viscusi,1984a,1984b,1985,1992). Child protective
mechanism on lighter devices decreased risk perception, parental anxiety with lighter
protection, and the necessity for consumer care heightening the potential for a mishap
(Viscusi and Cavallo,1996).
Peltzman (2001 ) proposed that when a medical irmovation overcomes a well-known
health risk, the direct outcome is improved health standard. He argued that the changed
health risk from such an irmovation may alter individual behavior. Time, effort and other
resources allocated to avoid risk that has been eradicated will now be free for other
activities, including those having additional mortality risk (Peltzman, 2001 ). The  1962
amendments of the U.S. Food Drug and Cosmetic Acts which were enacted to uplift
individuals' wellbeing led to increased consumer's losses instead of improving welfare as
originally plauned (Peltzman,1973a,1976b).
The Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA) of 1970 (29 USC 667,18) was
established nationwide to protect workers from job-related death, injury, and illnesses. It
was described as the ``Most significant legislative achievement for workers" (MacLaury
(1984), however, some studies aimed at evaluating the effects of OSHA have not found any
considerable benefits from its implementation.
Offsetting behavior has also been shown to be exhibited by workers in various
workplace settings. Firm-level safety measures, whether embarked on autonomously or
because of industry wide regulations affect actions undertaken by workers' negatively
(Viscusi,1979). Safety improvement measures by fims cause employees to reduce their
own safety precautions thus increasing the occurrence of injuries (Viscusi,1979).
Increased safety regulation to improve working conditions for workers actually
increases occupational death rate (Klick and Stratmann, 2003). They observed that when
workplace safety measures improved, workers took more risk and completely moved away
from personal safety precautions. Klick and Stratmann (2003) attributed this unpredictable
result to an occupational "Peltzman effect" (Peltzman,  1975).
Viscusi (1986) studied Workplace Safety Regulations in the U.S. manufacturing
industry for 10 years and found little evidence of safety benefits resulting from such
regulations. Mccaffrey ( 1983); Ruser and Smith ( 1991 ) caITying out their research for the
same period, arrived at similar conclusions as that from Viscusi (1986). In their research
using an expanded plant-level data set Gray and Mendeloff (2002) suggested that the effect
of workplace safety regulations dropped significantly during the  1990s.
The main objective of the farm policy is to stabilize fan income. However, despite
the enactment of these policies, farm failures are rising (Featherstone e/ cz/.,1998). Gabriel
and Baker (1980) proposed that policies which decrease business risk raise financial risk
due to larger borrowing. In line with the evaluations by Gabriel and Baker (1980), Collins
( 1985) presented a theoretical model of optimal leverage and illustrated that policies that
reduced risk on the other hand raising income caused farmers to increase their liability
relative to their assets.
Robinson and Barry (1987) studied the theoretical farm-level reaction to
Commodity Credit Corporation Loan programs. They went forth to hypothesize that credit
loan programs could lead to increased debt-asset ratio by farmers. These examples suggest
a case of offsetting behavior where policies were implemented to enhance the financial
position of farmers instead led them to take more risk (increased debt-to-asset) hence the
increased number of farm failures witnessed. Given the above aspects where offsetting
behavior is inherent, there is reason to suggest that offsetting behavior could be present in
food preparation and consumption considering that society is constantly being made aware
of progress made in food safety.
Detailed Examples of Major Policies and Outcomes Exhibiting Offsetting
Behavior
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) of the U.S. Department of
Agnculture (USDA) which has the responsibility to ensure that meat, poultry and egg
products are safe and accurately labeled (USDA, FSIS,1996) in 1996 introduced new
mandatory food safety regulations. This was following repeated discoveries of I. co/I.
0157:H7 and Scz/mo#e//cl in the US. Food supply chain (Antle, 2000). This modem
regulation called the Pathogen Reduction/ Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
(PR/HACCP) was to ensure the safety of meat and poultry products. The (PR/HACCP)
mandated the establishment of critical control points (CCPs) in food production and
processing operations, establishing regular testing for possible dangerous products.
A significant drop in pathogen levels was witnessed in the meat and poultry sectors
by the year 2000, after the mandatory adoption of PR/IIACCP (CDC, 2006). Reduction in
pathogen levels included: 30% reduction in Camp);/obacfer,  a 9% reduction in Scz/mo"e//a,
a 32% reduction in fz`s/erz.a, and a 29% reduction in E. co/I. 0157:H7 (CDC, 2006).   This
evaluation also indicated that there was a 41 % increase in  Vz.bri.o a bacterial pathogen
frequently associated with raw fish or sea food (filter feeders) (CDC, 2006).
Despite reduction in the level of most pathogens, the number of outbreaks from
retail facilities has increased noticeably (CDC, 2006). There were a significant number of
outbreaks in the vegetable sector in 2006, after the major fall in 2003 (CDC, 2006).
Nationally, the number of all food bone illness outbreaks per year has increased relatively
even though pathogen prevalence is lower. This difference between lower pathogen levels
and increasing outbreaks may suggest the presence of offsetting behavior in food-safety.
Statement of Problem
More than 200 known diseases are transmitted through food with causes of food
bone illnesses including viruses, bacteria, parasites, toxins, and metals (Bryan,1982).
Food borne illnesses associated with the pathogen outbreak (examples include: Scz/moHe//a,
I,I.s/erl.a, and E. co/I.) in the food chain represent a significant burden on the U.S. population
and the public health system as a whole. Foodbome diseases are estimated to cause
approximately 76 million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in the
United States annually (Kennedy e/ a/„  1999). The costs associated with these illnesses and
deaths in the form of direct medical expenses and lost productivity are estimated to be
between $5 and $6 billion armually (Mead e/ c!/.,  1999; Swanger and Rutherford, 2004)
with an annual total societal cost of $6-$37.1 billion to the U.S. economy (Buzby e/ a/.,
2001).
A huge number of pathogens presently that are responsible for most illnesses (e.g.
Campylobacter jejuni, E. colt 0\57 ..H] , Listeria monocytogenes, a.nd Cyc`lospora
cayefa7Ie"sz.s) were not recognized as causes of food bone illness merely 20 years ago
(Mead e/ a/.,1999). Known pathogens are responsible for approximately 14 million
illnesses, 60,000 hospitalizations, and  1,800 deaths with Sa/moHc//a, £z.s/erz.a and
rorap/czsm causing 1,500 deaths annually.
Outbreaks of food borne diseases have had an important influence on the
development of public health policy (Palmer e/ a/„ 2000). The  1993 E. coli 0157:H7
outbreak and previous food bone disease outbreaks led to public outage which motivated
government/regulators and the various industries @eef, fish, and vegetables and fruits) to
put in place stringent mechanisms which include: HACCP for the beef industry, HACCP
for all manne food and the Industry Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards in
Fruits and vegetables. Despite these stringent measures, there is still an increasing trend in
the number of pathogen outbreaks witnessed annually. Figure 1.1 presents the general trend
in foodbome illness outbreaks from 1983 to 2004. A steady and sharp increase is witnessed
from 1996 to 2000 after which a relative decrease is observed. This noticeable increase
coincided with the implementation of HACCP in the meat and poultry sector and the
Implementation of the "Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards in Fresh Fruits
and vegetables" in  1998. This suggest a case of offsetting behavior where policy
implementation to reduce mortality and morbidity from food consumption are reduced or
reversed.
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Figure 1.1 : Trends: Foodbome Disease Outbreak Surveillance System.
Source:  CDC (1983-2004).
Some advances have been undertaken in reducing the incidence of food bone
infections originating from four main pathogens including; £i.t7ferl.a, Compy/obacfer,
S%i.ge//a, oJcd yersz.#z.cz. Shiga toxin-producing E. co/j. has declined and is approaching
levels targeted by national health obj ectives (CDC, 2006). Onyango ef a/. (2006) advanced
that the 2006 E. co/I. 0157:H7 outbreak in spinach, which was responsible for more than
200 reported cases of illness and three deaths and previous outbreaks, have somehow upset
and wear down the public's trust in the regulatory agencies and belief they had in the safety
of the food supply chain. Holistically, consumers still have trust in the system. This self
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assurance might reduce their participation in ensuring that the food (vegetables) they
prepare and hence consume is safe.
Food-Safety Policies and Recalls in the Vegetable Sector
In 1998, due to an increase in reported outbreaks of food borne illnesses associated
with both domestic and imported fresh fruits and vegetables, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (USDA) published the "Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards
for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables" (FDA, CFSAN,1998). This move was to support
continuing efforts to develop national guidelines for food safety of fruits and vegetables.
This document is intended to serve as guidance only. It is meant to address microbial food
safety hazards and good agricultural practices common to the growing, harvesting,
packing, and transportation of most fruits and vegetables sold and consumed in an
unprocessed or minimally processed (raw) form (FDA, CFSAN,1998).
Food recalls play a significant part in ensuring food safety. Recalls involve the
removal of a food product from circulation by the producing firm when there is reason to
believe that this product is contaminated or misbranded (Title 21  CFR 7.3 (g)). Recalls as
such are voluntary but regulated by the FDA` The Food and Drug Administration Under
(title 21  CFR 7) has guidelines for companies to follow when recalling adulterated
products from circulation. These guidelines categorize recalls into one of three classes
according to the level (descending order) of hazard involved. These are class I,11, and Ill
recalls.
In its regulatory role of scrutinizing foods under recall, the Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
observed an increase in the number of recalls of dried spices (any aromatic vegetable
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substance in whole, broken or in ground fom) due to adulteration. While only two such
recalls occuITed during the 1990s,16 recalls were witnessed from 2000 through the first
quarter of 2004 (Vibha e/ cr/., 2006).
A noticeable increase in the number of recalls has been witnessed in the vegetable
(fresh cut) sector. Some of these have been blamed on the non mandatory nature of good
agricultural practice across the industry (Krauter, 2007). The 2003 green onion hepatitis A
outbreak that originated from Mexico and the recent 2006 E. colio157:H7 and Sc!/mo#c//a
nationwide outbreaks (Onyango e/ cz/., 2007) that led to recalls of varying magnitude are
some major examples.
Goal, Objectives, and Hypothesis
The goal of this study is to develop risk tolerance indexes using factor analysis and
use them to model the impact of information on consumers' perception of risk, handling
and, preparation of vegetables when more stringent measures are put in place by
government for the safety of vegetables. Emphasis is put on how positive and negative
information impact risk perceptions, handling, and preparation practices. The specific
objectives of this research are:
-          To examine the relationship between food-safety associated risk tolerance and
consumers' perception of risk.
-         To evaluate and model the impact of both positive and negative information on
consumers' perception of risk. This involves measuring how consumers react to new
information on the safety of the vegetables they consume. This will then be employed
to assess the presence or absence of offsetting behavior in the preparation and
consumption of vegetables.
To provide guidelines and scope for policy makers to take into account offsetting
behavior where it is significant, such that predicted food safety policy effects can be
more accurately stated.
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The hypothesis of this study is that there is no offsetting behavior exhibited by
consumers in their preparation and consumption of vegetables. That is, putting in place of
measures (PR/HACCP) to minimize the level of pathogen in vegetables actually does not
change consumers' perceptions in such a way that they become less cautious on how they
prepare and consume their vegetables. Specifically, we would test the null hypothesis that
offsetting behavior does not exist in vegetable preparation and consumption with positive
food safety information from policy.
Evidence of Offsetting Behavior in Vegetable Preparation and
Consumption
Apart from the health benefits associated with regular consumption of vegetables, it
presents other particular characteristics which make it suitable for our analysis.
-             Vegetables are consumed in an unprocessed or minimal processed (raw) form.
-             Vegetables are responsible for an increasing number of outbreaks.
There exists a large collection of literature on offsetting behavior dealing
principally with traffic accident and mortality (Peltzman,1975; Sagberg e/ cz/.,  1997),
workplace safety (Viscusi,1986; Klick and Stratmann, 2003) and consumer products
accidents and mortality (Viscusi,1984a,1984b,1985,1992).
Taking these studies into account and  considering the potential relevance of
offsetting behavior where the implementation of policies alters consumers' behavior,
certain observations can  lead us to imply that offsetting behavior maybe present in the
food sector and hence in the preparation and consumption of vegetables. Additionally, the
increase trend of the number of nationwide recalls witnessed in recent years might be an
indication of the presence of offsetting behavior in food-safety. Despite measures
implemented in the form of regulations and guidelines to mitigate the level ofpathogens
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found in vegetables, the number of outbreaks and contaminations are on the rise instead of
lessening.
Organization of the Study
This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter I presented a general background
on areas where offsetting behavior exists and detailed examples in the food sector which
suggest the existence of offsetting behavior in food safety. Chapter 11 reviews the food-
safety policies in the different sectors, providing the benefits and cost of these regulations.
It also provides insight on how information shapes consumers ' perception of risk. Chapter
Ill presents methods. It describes the offsetting behavior theoretical framework, empirical
procedures, and the data used for the study. Chapter IV presents Results. Chapter V
summarizes and concludes the study with imphcations and suggestions.
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CHAPTER 11
LITERATURE REVIEW
Comparative Analysis of Food-Safety Policies
Intervention should be undertaken only if regulations can be designed in such a way
that they produce positive over all benefits (Arrow e/ a/.,  1996). However, current
outbreaks of food borne illnesses have increased fears about the effectiveness of protective
measures designed and put in place to guarantee food safety (Antle,1995; Caswell,1991).
Motivations for producers to embark on protective actions can be provided either through
private quality control systems or through a public system (Segerson,  1999). Private quality
control works through the market (e.g., reputation or certification and labeling) while the
public system is determined by public policy design (e.g., direct regulation of processes or
product quality) (Caswell and Henson,1997; Henson e/ a/.,1999).
Caswell (1988) suggested that though the Federal Goverrment has a long record of
regulation of food quality and safety, there has been a movement towards increased
regulation in recent years probably due to the sporadic outbreaks witnessed in the past few
years. Food-safety policy is currently based on a combination of voluntary measures
undertaken by producers and regulatory measures imposed by government (Segerson,
1999). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) mandated fims in the food-processing sector, including the meat and poultry
sector and the seafood sector, to implement Pathogen Reduction/IIazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP) in  1996 and 1994, respectively, and provided a document
titled the "Guidance to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards for Fresh Fruits and
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Vegetable" (Morris,1997; FDA, CFSAN,1998). HACCP was also proposed for the fresh
fruit juice industry in 1998.
HACCP is regarded in the food industry as an effective tactic to setup good
production, sanitation, and manufacturing practices that enhance the safety of food (Pierson
and Corlett,1992). The International Commission on Microbial Specifications for Foods
(ICMF,1988) stated that the HACCP framework establishes process control through the
identification of stages in the production process that are most vital to monitor and control.
Its preventive approach of consideration is seen as more cost-effective (ICMSF,1988) and
useful to control any stage in the food system intended to provide adequate feedback to for
necessary corrective action.
The National Advisory Committee on Microbial Criteria for Foods
(NACMCF,  I 992) provided the basic steps vital in developing and operating an HACCP
plan. These steps include
Evaluate the hazard, outline the steps in the process where a major exposure can
occur, and explain the prevention measure.
Ascertaln critical control points (CCPs) in the process.
Set up critical limits for each CCP.
Institute procedures to check each CCP.
Determine corrective actions to be taken while observing any departure from the
CCP limits.
Set up record keeping for the HACCP system.
Determine steps to ensure the HACCP system is effective.
By strategically emphasizing the need to put emphasis on inspections at CCPs,
HACCP improves the scientific basis for safety and control processes, with evaluation at
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CCP undertaken by using efficient and effective indicators (Unnevehr and Jensen,1998).
They also advanced that these indicators are a more cost-effective approach relative to
product sampling which is more costly and possibly will not provide appropriate results.
Any point in the food processing chain from primary materials, unfinished to finished
product where improper control could lead to food contamination is what is termed a CCP
a'ierson and Corlett,1992).
The application of HACCP as a regulatory standard to a whole industry, a sector,
and at different points in a supply network is distinctive. Firstly, it can be linked to a
system-wide risk assessment (NRC,1985; Hathaway,1995) which makes possible the
identification of potential hazards and the scientific measure for reducing the risks
presented by them. Secondly, it may be corrected to a peculiar standard for food safety
which is necessary for the allocation of critical limits at CCPs (Unnevehr and Jensen,
1996).
The two characteristics of HACCP have inference for the cost/benefit analysis of
regulation, for recognition of HACCP in intemational trade (Caswell and Hooker,1996)
and its public health implication (Satcher, 2000). These attributes notwithstanding, there is
an ongoing argument as to whether mandatory HACCP systems are necessary since some
firms have chosen to voluntarily undertake the HACCP plan (Caswell and Henson,1997).
They advanced doubts as to whether voluntary measure would ensure adequate consumer
protection.
Throughout the past two decades, the amount of produce consumed per capita has
been increasing steadily generating a heightened likelihood for produce-related foodbome
diseases (Sewell and Farber, 2001 ). Half of the produce associated outbreaks may be
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attributed to kitchen level cross contamination, the rest may be attributed to produce
already contaminated with E.  co/I. before purchase (Ranagck a/ a/., 2005). Between 1982
and 2002, out of the 350 outbreaks witnessed in 49 states, about one fifth were attributed to
fresh produce with the principal vector being E.  co/I. 0157:H7 (Ranagek ef fl/., 2005). The
increase in reported outbreaks of food bone illness associated with both domestic and
imported fresh fruits and vegetables led the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue "Guidance for Industry- Guide to
Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables" (FDA, CFSAN,
1998)
This guide was to serve as guidance only, to assist growers and packers to continue
to improve the safety of domestic and imported products (FDA, CFSAN,1998).  It carried
no regulatory, legal or enforcement weight. However it is recommended in the document
that every producer of fresh fruits and vegetable consider the implementation of these risk
reduction strategies outlined in the guideline appropriate to their operation. Retail buyers
are beginning to demand that suppliers of flesh product adhere to the guidelines and show
proof by documentation of practices and third party audits. The guide recognizes eight
principles of food safety within the areas of growing, harvesting, and transportation of
fresh product which are termed; Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) which is analogous to
Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) required for the processing industry.
These principles under the "Guide to Minimize Microbial Hazard for Fresh Fruits and
Vegetables" (pp. 5) (FDA, CFSAN,1998) are given as follows:
"Prevention of microbial contanination of fresh produce is favored over reliance on
corrective action after contamination has occurred." ®p. 5).
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"To minimize microbial food safety hazards in fresh produce, growers, packers or
shippers should use good practice in the area over which they have control."(pp. 5).
"Fresh produce can become microbiologically contaminated at any point along the
farm-to -table food chain. The major source of microbial contamination with fresh
produce is associated with human or animal feces." (pp. 5).
"Whenever water comes into contact with produce, its source and quality dictate the
potential for contamination. Minimize the potential of microbial contamination
from water." ®p. 5).
"Practices using animal manure or municipal biosolid waste should be managed
closely to minimize the potential for microbial contamination of
fresh produce." (pp.  5).
"Workers hygiene and sanitation practices during production, harvest, sorting,
packing and transport play a critical role in minimizing the potential for microbial
contamination of fresh produce." (pp. 5)
"Follow all applicable local, state. and Federal laws and regulations, or
corresponding or similar laws, regulations or standards for agricultural practices for
operators outside the U.S., for agncultural practices." (pp. 5).
"Accountability at all levels of the agncultural environment (farm, packing facility,
distribution center, and transport operation) is important to a successful food safety
program. There must be qualified personnel and effective monitoring to ensure that
all elements of the program function correctly and to help track produce back
through the distribution channel to the producer." (pp. 5).
Based on these principles, specific guidance for pathogen reduction is provided for the
following areas:
Manures and municipal biosolids
Agricultural water
Processing water
Health and sanitation
Sanitation and trace back.
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FDA efforts to protect fruits and vegetables from contamination have been very
limited (Onyango e/ a/., 2007). They noted that in 2005, the FDA conducted 4,573 on-site
inspections of agricultural processing sites. In 2006 they were supposed to conduct 3,400
inspections indicating a 25°/o drop. A general public concern is that the regulatory agencies
should increase their vigilance in order to uplift the genuine and perceived food safety
issues in the fruits and vegetable sector (Onyango ef cr/., 2007)
In the face of the apparent inadequacy of the regulatory agencies, the state of
California, the origin of the recent 2006 spinach outbreak which led to a nationwide recall
is pushing towards enacting changes in food-safety regulation to enhance the safety of
consumers (Krauter, 2007). The regional Director for the U.S. Food Drug Administration
for the pacific region indicated that cunent agricultural practices in the fruits and vegetable
sectors are inadequate in preventing contamination (Krauter, 2007). He emphasized the
need for mandating good agricultural practices across the industry which so far is voluntary
or sel f-regulatory.
Benefits and Costs of Food-Safety Regulation
The recurrent detection of fresh or frozen vegetables, fish, meat, and poultry
infected with pathogens such as E. colt 0\ 57 , Campylobacter. Listeria, and Salmonella has
been of great concern to government and regulatory agencies. This has led the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) of the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to mandate
new quality control regulations and testing in the meat sector (USDA, FSIS  1996) and for
the FDA and the CFSAN (FDA, CFSAN, 1998) to provide guidelines for the safety of
fruits and vegetable. The new regulations are intended to uplift the inspection system that
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has been acknowledged to be lacking in the prevention of microbial contamination in the
meat sector (National Research Council,  1985) and in the fruits and vegetable sector (FDA,
CFSAIN,1998).
Antle (1999) indicated the design of food-safety regulations in the past was
undertaken by government regulators and food technologists, they neither took into account
economic efficiency nor the potential allocation effects of regulations associated with food
safety. Regulatory structures and authorities are confronted with new and ongoing food
safety challenges (Henson and Caswell,1999).
These challenges involve dealing with new likely food borne risks like genetically
modified organisms while at the same time looking for ways to improve control of existing
risks like E.  co/I. 0157 (Henson and Caswell,1999). This follows ever increasing pressure
for improved control as a means of sustaining consumers' tmst in the safety of the food
supply due to frequent "food scares" (Henson and Caswell,1999, USDA,1995). Another
view is that existing food-safety regulations from an economics perspective are considered
uureliable creating the need for more efficient regulation which rely on performance
principles (Antle,1995).
The change in consumers' worries from food sufficiency to food quality
particularly the safety of meat and poultry products (USDA,  1995) and the struggle by
most governments to reduce the estimated costs of government plans and enhance the
effectiveness and international viability of their economies (Jacobs,1997) has influenced
the way food-safety regulations are structured, developed and implemented (Antle,1999).
These changes have lead to the performance of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) in the
public decision making framework. Demsetz ( 1969) provided the groundwork for RIA
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based on benefit-cost analysis. RIA based on benefit-cost analysis is becoming an integral
part of the U.S. government policy structuring process (Antle, 2000). Morall (1997) stated
that U.S policy requires RIA of all policies with potential influence of at least $100 million.
Economists are in favor of standards for benefit-cost analysis of environmental,
health and safety regulation in perspective of its application in federal regulations, (Arrow
e/ a/.,  1996). Regulations in the food safety field in the past have not necessarily been on
the grounds of the benefit-cost concept (Antle,1995,1996). The rise in demand for
regulatory accountability has led to the growth in govemments' demand for risk assessment
and benefit-cost analysis for proposed and existing regulations which are aimed at
safeguarding the wellbeing of the general public (Caswell, 2000). From an economic view
point, regulations should not be put into practice if their benefits do not exceed their cost
(Asch,  1988). The Government Perfomance and Results Act (GPRA,  1993) required
agencies to conceive effective regulations which are required to satisfy benefit-cost
appraisals at both the agency level and Presidential Office of Management and Budget
level.
Benefits of Food-Safety Regulation
The ultimate benefits of food safety regulations are reduction in the likelihood of
deaths and illnesses associated with the consumption of foods that could be contaminated
with microbial pathogens and other related hazards (Antle,1999). Superior food quality
provision helps protect and sustaln consumers' health against external health dangers,
providing restoration in the advent of impairment (van Ravenswaay,1995). The theoretical
evaluation of the benefits of food-safety regulations has as economic foundation approach
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that have been built up to model and assess reductions in health risk ( Caswell,1998; van
Ravenswaay,1995).
Due to the multitude of quality attributes of food products and the lack of market
value for benefits to be calculated, a series of approaches have been advanced to value the
benefits of safer food (Caswell,1998). These factors coupled with the lack of infomation
related to attributes make market estimations of the benefits of food safety difficult
(Henson and Trall,1993; Kinsey,1993). Antle (1999) indicated that an individual's need
for risky foods is reliant on the individuals' income, market prices, the associated actual
risk, the observed risk, the likelihood of exposure and the individuals' vulnerability to the
rlsk.
Contingent valuation and experimental market models have been used to derive
expressions for willingness to pay (WTP) (Brown e/ a/„ 2005; Lin and Milon,  1995;
Buzby, Ready and Skees,1995; Hayes e/ a/.,1995) averting behavior cost (Eon,1995),
resource expenditures on medical costs and labor productivity (Roberts,1991) for reduced
risk morbidity and mortality. Models for willingness to pay tend to suggest that willingness
to pay for reduced morbidity has four simple components has four components including;
cost of treating the illness, forgone income from lost work time, costs of averting illness;
and the disvalue of illness (Harrington and Portney,1987; Berger eJ a/.,1994).
The most widely used approach to value morbidity is to estimate the cost of illness
(Col) (Kenkel,1994; CAST,1994). This approach involves the measurement of the
medical cost of an illness plus the foregone market income due to lost work time. The cost
of illness (Col) approach tends to be sensitive to the worth attributed to the life recovered
(Buzby e/ cl/.,1996). The USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) used the cost of illness
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(COI) method to estimate the aunual resource expenditure for illnesses caused by four
food-bone pathogen (Sa/mo7Ie//a, CTczmp};/obc]c/er, E. co/r 0157 and fi.sferi.cr) targeted by
the FSIS HACCP proposal (Buzby c/ cz/.,  1996). The annual food-bone disease costs in the
HACCP proposal stood at $1. I -$4.1  billion. They suggested that this estimate was a partial
measure of society's opportunity cost. If these food borne illnesses were reduced these
resources would be reallocated.
The Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) regulatory impact assessment concluded
that over a 20 year time horizon, the benefits of HACCP implementation would be on the
scale of $0.99 to $3.69 billion yearly with the assumption that the regulation was effective
in eliminating the risks of illness and death from pathogen contamination. ERS discounted
this amount over this period at 7°/o, and estimated the public health benefits from HACCP
to be between $7.13 and $26.59 billion.
The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) asserted that the net benefits of
food-safety regulations were probably positive for all amounts of regulatory effectiveness
(Crutchfleld ef czl.,1997). Evaluating the increased entry to foreign markets is another
increasingly used method for evaluating the benefits of food-safety regulations (Roberts
and DeRemer,1997). The estimation of the benefits of the benefits of food-safety
regulations presented so far have not taken into account offsetting behavior therefore are
liable to errors. There is need to estimate the true benefits of food-safety regulations.
Costs of Food-Safety Regulation
Existing policies intended to improve food-safety are reliant on public regulations
and market incentives. Given the market incentives to improve food-safety, firms possibly
will implement hazard control measures in an effort to achieve strategic benefits (Stigler,
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1971 ; Peltzman,1976) in perspective of further severe regulation (Segerson,1999). The
combination of both private and public motivations to enhance food-safety coupled with
the self-motivated response of industry towards regulation complicates makes the
estimation of the cost of food-safety regulations complicated (Uhnevehr and Jensen, 2001 ).
Going from a general perspective, the costs of food-safety regulation may be a
combination of, associated administrative costs, quality guarantee plans undertaken
voluntarily to enhance market share, or conform to industry's and goverrment mandated
regulatory standards (Antle, 2000) or holistically to fulfill consumers' demand. At the
plant-level, these costs include; assessing and developing control procedures, anti microbial
treatments, record keeping, employee training, and microbial testing (FSIS).
Analysis of the costs of food-safety regulation starts at the point of the production
process tolant level), and it requires taking into account production processes that allow for
higher quality products (Antle,  1999). A significant amount of  studies have been
undertaken to evaluate the cost structure of meat and various food processing plants and
potential costs that food-safety regulation cause plants to incur using different approaches.
In the United States, approximations of the cost of conformity of the mandatory
HACCP in the seafood, meat, and poultry industries were an essential element of the final
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) (FSIS,1996; Crutchfield ef a/.,1997). The FDA and
the FSIS projected the costs of mandatory HACCP regulations for their Regulatory inpact
Assessment (RIA) applying an accounting approach (FDA,1994; FSIS,1996). They
estimated the four year execution of HACCP in the meat and poultry sector to stand at
between $305 and $357 million. The accounting method for the evaluation of HACCP has
been used in some evaluation studies (e.g. Colatore and Caswell,1998).
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French ( 1977) presented the application of the economic-engineering approach to
examine the cost structure of processing processes. Jensen and Unnevehr ( 1999) applied
the economic-engineering approach to estimate the cost of carcass rinses, sanitizing sprays,
steam vacuums and water pasteurization in pork processing. They found out that the cost of
specific pathogen mitigation strategies are in the scale of $0.03 to $0.20 for each carcass of
hogs with the most favorable mix of strategies being as high as $0.47 per carcass.
Holistically, they concluded that the costs of pathogen mitigation undertakings correspond
to less than 2% of processing costs
Klein and Brester (1997) used an econometrics techniques estimated a cost function
to evaluate USDA's zero-tolerance for fecal contamination on the cost of production so as
to show how this order could impact productivity and costs. They found out that cost of
production increased with increased safety. They estimated the costs of the zero-tolerance
order for meat plants to be approximately $3 billion with expectations for these costs to
reduce over time as a result of economies of scope. Antle (1999) studied the U.S. beef,
pork, and chicken slaughter and processing plants and found out that more stringent food
safety regulations is associated with increased costs of production. Using the Census of
Manufacturers data to estimate total cost function for beef, pork and miscellaneous meat
products, Ollinger (1998) discovered that cost of production was linked to rising safety. His
results were similar with those of Antle (1999) that higher product safety is associated with
increased cost of production.
Offsetting Behavior and Food-Safety Information
Food is an important provider of physical welfare and a main supplier of pleasure,
wony and stress (Rozin et a/.,1996). Due to their large economic impact (e.g. sales loss
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and welfare effects), incidents of chemical and bacterial contamination of food receive
great attention (Foster and Just,1989). Perceived product quality after an adverse event
plays a crucial part in individual's consumption decisions (Swartz and Strand,1981) which
arise because consumers are faced with a wide range of competitively priced food products
of consistently high quality. Consumer' s concerns about food-related risks appear to induce
them to embark on some type of protective action to reduce health risk (Swartz and Strand,
1981; Foster and Just,1989; Eom,1994).
Although these studies present significant evidence on consumer's revealed
preference for safer and healthier food, a good number of valuation research studies on
food-safety and nutrition have failed to take into account consumers' risk perception into
the behavioral structure (Eom,1995). Perceptions and beliefs are fomed by knowledge,
which is as a result of exposure to information sources and individual effort in getting it
(Mclntosh e/ a/.,1994). The risks perceived by consumers depends on infomation about
the quality and safety of a product that can be received from a variety of sources including
media coverage (Powell and Grlflths,1994; Buzby and Ready,1996), ffiends and personal
experience and with both negative and positive infomation having varying influence (Liu
cf a/.,  1998). Some psychological science studies have recognized forty-seven factors that
affect consumers' perception of risk which are concerned with if the risk is "alarming,
unmanageable, tragic and not counterbalanced by compensating benefits" (Covello,1983).
Perception of risk is also responsive to views about the agent or organization responsible
for a particular task (Ipsos-Reid, 2001 ).
A consumers' risk perception is likely to be unbalanced, short lasting and to vary
over time as a result of both positive and negative news (Liu e/ a/.,1998). Consumers can
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therefore learn about a particular risk and change their risk perceptions after getting new
information (Viscusi and O'Connor,  1984; Smith and Johnson,1988). In Figure 2. I , news
of a contamination report causes the perceived risk  A P  to move away from the original risk
perception. New favorable information helps consumers to slowly adjust their risk
perception back down to the objective level indicated by cr.
Negative media reporting of food contamination occurrence can result in sales
tosses with the provision of positive information after such an incident having policy
inferences for producers and public institutions (Swartz and strand,  1981 ; Johnson,1988;
Smith e/ 4/.,1988). Lichtenstein c/ cz/. (1978) suggested from a psychological perspective
that the unbalanced emphasis on "negative" media report relative to a "positive" report
could lead individuals' to overestimate health risks.   Psychology and economics studies
carried out by Rowe e/ cz/. (2000) and Smith e/ cz/. (1988), respectively, indicated that
infomation from media coverage of a food-safety incident might increase the fear of a
hazard compared to the level of the outbreak. They all concluded that the nature of
information notwithstanding; the risks perceived by an individual is based upon the volume
of coverage that will lead to a negative response from the public as a whole.
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I
Figure 2.1 : Change in Perceived Risk with Positive Information After an Unfavorable
Shock.
Source:  Lui ef a/.  (1998).
Wynne (1980) proposed that trust in risk management institutions maybe a vital
factor in shaping pereeptions and risk taking. Slovic (1993) found out that there was a link
between trust and risk perception. Trust is therefore viewed as one requirement for
effective risk communication (Kasperson cf a/.,1992). Lui e/ a/. (1998) evaluated and
found out that there exist a link between trust, risk and food safety concern given media
and other related information. From an economic perspective, it is necessary to evaluate the
link between trust consumers place on "institutions" or food suppliers and
government/regulators on consumers purchasing behavior (Bocker and Hanf, 2000).
Onyango e/ c!/. (2007), writing after the 2006 nationwide spinach recall, suggested
that trust in private and public institutions ]jnked with food safety have considerable impact
on an individual's food safety perception. This influence is displayed by the public's trust
of those regulatory agencies associated with food safety (e.g., U.S. Department of
29
agriculture (USDA), Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)). Goodacre cf c7/. ( 1999) looked at surveys ofpublic opinion carried
out by the U.S. Food Marketing Institute in  1996 and concluded that most consumers were
confident that the food they purchased was safe for consumption.
The results presented in Onyango e/ a/. (2006) coupled with studies by Goodacre
e/ a/. (1999) implied that consumers in the United States have trust in government actions
and regulation aimed at the enhancement of food safety. This presents an avenue for the
evaluation of offsetting behavior. Offsetting behavior is implied by reduced concern by
consumers in reaction to positive information about the impact of policies aimed at
mitigating the risk of cc>ntamination.
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CHAPTER Ill
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Theoretical Framework
Peterson ef a/. (1995) and Poitras and Sutter (2002) advanced that Prior to building
up a suitable theory on 08, it is essential to make clear certain concerns associated to
command and control policies, sorting issues which develop due to information asymmetry
and 08. Direct interventions involve command and control principles for implementation
which utilizes sampling techniques to check a product's quality (Hathaway,1995). Control
interventions directly state actions to be undertaken in realizing improved final products;
these are widely identified as Good Manufacturing Processes (GMPs) (Hathaway,  1995).
Poitras and Sutter (2002) claimed that the mandatory car safety inspection proved
futile because of its command control design. They suggested that this design increased
consumers' cost. To them, the ineffectiveness was not due to alteration in consumers'
payoff due to offsetting behavior.
Peterson e/ a/. ( 1995) went further and indicated that the principal policy failure
with air-bag equipped cars was as a consequence of the sorting problem. They argued that
the ineffectiveness of the program to reduce accidents occurred due to the fact that reckless
drivers initially bought the safety equipped cars as such as non aggressive drivers
progressively possessed air bag equipped cars, the rate of accident occurrence for such cars
deteriorated. This study has as motivation the application of food safety infomation from
PR/HACCP that is based on performance standards in the fresh vegetable sector where
such a policy is nonexistent. Such a move will help us to evaluate if consumers become lax
in reaction to information of the potential impact of the implementation of such a policy.
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The theoretical model on 08 for this study follows directly from that presented by
Nganje ef cl/. (2007). To present the theoretical model of offsetting behavior, the expected
accident loss model by Hause (2006) was expanded to incorporate two measures. The flrst
measure is offsetting behavior which, in this case, is represented by consumers' perception
of risks. The second measure encompasses consumers' behavior regarding safe vegetable
preparation and consumption. The theoretical model is represented in Equation 1.
4(I,J,)=7r(J,)I(J,) mE
The theoretical model above can be decomposed into two components. The f]rst
component is a production function of expected accident loss which represents the cost of
illness or death from a foodbome illness. The second component is an objective function
which describes a potential victim's tradeoff between utilizing avoidance expenditure, );, to
reduce the likelihood of getting sick or deciding to purchase other goods.
•4(x, };) is the cost of illness or death caused by a food bone illness. The level of
food safety is given by  I (in this situation representing the assumption that a perfomance
policy standard like PR/HACCP exists in the vegetable sector). ); is the monetary
equivalence of consumer hazard avoidance behavior.  %(};)  is the probability of a
foodbome illness or death occurring, and I(x) represents the monetary equivalent loss to
the victim should illness or death occur. 7r(};)IT  and I(I) are assumed to be non-negative,
strictly decreasing, smooth convex functions defined onx, y e [0,+co] . The consumers'
optimal response for all values of x  considered is defined as y(I > 0) . An assumption that
a consumer will choose his optimal hazard avoidance value, y, when given  I  is also made.
In such a scenario, I  represents expenditure for employing PR/HACCP, which is mirrored
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in an average individual's perception of risk. The average individual will, therefore, decide
on  ); (the monetary equivalent of consumer hazard expenditure) given his perception of
risk after  x (food safety policy PR/HACCP in this case) has been established by policy.
This is obtainable because, by assumption,  I(x) 2 0 . Equation 2 represents the behavioral
assumption of offsetting behavior.
E(C)=J-[A(x,J,)+J,]'
whereJ  is the total income.
(2)
Equation 2 is the second component in the offsetting behavior model expressing the
behavioral assumption that a consumer decides on avoidance expenditure with the aim of
maximizing his expected consumption (Hause, 2006). Differentiating equation 2 in terms
of)/ , we arrive at equation 3.
MarE(C)oA4J.nL4(x,);)+J']+
d[4(x,y)+y]=d[7roly(x)+}J]
(ly                                dy
z'(J,)I,(x) + 1              (3)
Equation 2 is differentiated with respect to  }; to arrive at equation (3) because it is
considered that an individual who decides on j4(x, y)  and obtaining other goods is an
average consumer. This individual has only  ); at his disposal (monetary equivalent of
consumer hazard expenditure) and not  x (level of food safety regulation in this case
PR/IIACCP). From his or her viewpoint,  x is fixed and taken as a constant. Due to the fact
that we are looking for the maximum of expected consumption ( E(C)) which corresponds
to minimizing [4(x, }J) + )/] , there is need to equate the first derivative to zero. Going from
our assumptions, we already know that  j4(¥, )/)  has a minimum and that  )J is non-negative.
By implicit differentiation of our first derivative, we get equation (4).
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fr,O#£(x,--",(yp(x,-y,--[
Definition 1
(4)
To present a scenario for the existence of offsetting behavior, x  (the food safety
regulation) is set to be zero (that is no information has been given to consumers) as such
); = };(0) the expected accident loss therefore becomes 7rb;(O)|£(0) . As a result of the
adoption of pR/1IACCP gets new information thus gets into the hands of consumer,
consequently expenditures  j:'  > 0 (e.g. PR/IIACCP application and monitoring
expenditures). It follows that consumers' offsetting behavior occurs if equation (5) below is
satisfied.
7r|y(xi)tr(xi)>„b,(0)i£(xi).
Proposition 1
(5)
Food safety policies expenditures  x  always cause offsetting behavior by consumers
in the representation of expected hazard loss.
Proof of proposition 1
Examining the sign of )J'   from equation (4) leads us to equation 6
y,--(£'(I)„'(J,)£„ < 0, Vjr, J, 2 0 (6)
As  7r(I)  and  £0;)  by assumption are non-negative, ( I,(I) 2 0 and 7r(};) 2 0 ) strictly
decreasing and smooth functions as such ( I,'(x) < 0 and ff();) < 0 ) and again
( £'(I) > 0 and 7r"(}J) > 0 . It is expect that if an average consumer believes that the risk
related with getting sick from food borne disease is reduced because of new safety
information from implemented regulation, then it seems that such an individual's health
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hazal.d avoidance expenditure should reduce consequently. This is intuitive since  };(I)  is a
decreasing function of x (having a negative slope )/' < 0 ). This result concurs with the fact
that an increase ofx from zero to  j¥'  will mean a consequent reduction of }; from  )/(0)
toj;(x').Thisimpliesthatwithnewinformation,theprobabilityofafoodsafetyhazard
occurring increases ( IT will increase from  frh(0)] to  7r|y(x] )I  the above result is a case of
o ffsetting behavior.
Dominant Offsetting Behavior
Definition 2
Consumers' offsetting behavior is dominant if it more than completely offsets the
reduction in expected health hazard loss from the direct effect of the food safety policy.
Proposition 2
If an increase in x signifies dominant offsetting behavior to the consumer, therefore
the level of food safety regulation  x  is an inferior factor in improving the health hazard
loss to consumers as a result of a food bone illness.
Proof of Proposition 2
Dominantoffsettingbehavioroccursiftheinequality,4[x',y(x')|>.4[0,y(0)]is
satisfied and jn line with definition, a factor of production is inferior if higher output uses
less of the factor. All elements within the range of function A  correspond to a harmful
(loss) event for individuals'  and society as a whole. Therfore -£4 , the negative value
embodies a gain to individuals'  and society at large. If a rise in  x  brings about dominant
offsetting behavior, then  I must be an inferior factor in the production of- A , more of x
means less of - 4 .
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In order to detect the conditions necessary for dominant offsetting behavior, the
marginal effect of I  is divided into the direct effect of x (e.g. the reduction in health
hazard loss after the new food safety policy have been implemented) and the indirect
offsetting behavior of x  on  ); . To do this, we proceed to define the marginal effect of x as
follows;
4(I) = <4[x,};(x)] , and move forward to take total derivative to amve at equation (7).
[#]=4 (7)
is the consulners' marginal offsetting behavior. It evaluates by what proportion
the direct marginal effect of x on  j4  is decreased by the victims' offsetting behavior. If the
marginal offsetting behavior is greater than 1  for 0 < x < L¥' , this will mean dominant
offsetting behavior for food safety policy jr+ . This is the case due to the fact that  I -
will be negative, which is multiplied by  £4.  and becomes positive. Consequently,
[#],spositive, leading us to arrive at the conclusion that the function
j4(x) = i4[x,}J(x)]  will rise for  jc' relative to  x  ultimately causing dominant offsetting
behavior. We substitute equation (1) into equation (7) to get equation (8).
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4y
.I
4
4
an=al'
dr
where
„77„
„7r„
(8)
is the reduction of the marginal direct effect of x due to offsetting behavior
which is dependent on  )/ and not x .
Proposition 3
If the log of the likelihood of a food borne illness or death incidence function is
concave and decreasing, the offsetting behavior is dominant. If the log of the probability or
death occuITence function is convex and decreasing, then the offsetting behavior is partial.
Proof of Proposition 3
log[7r();)]  is a decreasing function  vy 2 0  since  7r' < 0 and
Again, iflogly] , is concave, then
dy2
7r"fr -
dy                      n,2
dlog[ff(J,)]=i<o.
T
< 0 , multiplying
thisexpressionbyfweamveat
„7r„
< 0 . For the reason
that#ispositiveandthereforetheinequalitysignremainsthesane.Wethushave
thatan=al'
„7r„
. This denotes dominant offsetting behavior if the previous
expression is multiplied once small byfl > 0, £' < 0 .
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Partial Offsetting Beliavior
Consumers' offsetting behavior is partial if it less than absolutely counterbalances
the decrease in expected health hazard loss from the direct impact of the food safety policy.
If the marginal offsetting behavior is less than 1  foro < x < x * , this implies partial
offsettingbehaviorforfoodsafetypolicyx*duetothefactl-#willbepositive
Multiplying this expression by  Ax  causes the expression to become negative. Showing that
in this situation, the expression; is negative. The function  .4(x) = .4[x, }J(I)]  will
decrease for  :r. in comparison to x , resulting in partial offsetting behavior for the food
safetypolicyTheconsumersmarginaloffsettingbehavior,#isposltivesince
( J4ry  > 0, 4y,  > 0, 4  < 0 , and 4,  < 0 ).
Empirical Analysis
While U.S.  food supplies are usually recognized as safe, there has been an increase
in reported outbreaks associated with both domestic and imported fresh fruits and
vegetables (FDA, CFSAN,  1998). This trend is an indication that food borne diseases are
not uncommon since a huge number of food bone pathogens are presently known to cause
diseases in humans (Buzby e/ c7/., 2001).  Such sporadic and often publicized food bone
disease outbreaks create an environment of fear in consumers.
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Viscusi and Magat (1987) showed that the impact of stronger informational content
on preventive measure is based on the implied endowed (objective) risk compared to the
consumers' subjective risk. They went forth and said consumers' risk associated decisions
need some appraisal but such an assessment is complex; since consumers develop
subjective probabilities based on their beliefs of a particular hazard.
Consumers' perception of food bone risk is affected by the following factors: locus
of control, personal health influence, outrage and demographic characteristics (Eom,1995 ;
Nganje ef cz/., 2005). An important subject in the evaluation of consumers' perception of
risk stems from the fact that the initial perceived risks of individuals are frequently
unobservable, they can however be obtained through survey methods (Smith cf a/.,  I 990).
In this study, a survey based on questions on factors that affect consumers' foodbome
related risk perception, handling, and preparation practices was carried out.  Survey and
related questions are found on table Al  of the appendix section.
Factor analysis was used to create risk tolerance indexes for each of the factors that
influence consumers' perception of risk. Only those factors that had significant enough
contribution were used to carry out the empirical analysis. Two models were used to
evaluate subjects' offsetting behavior. This evaluation was carded out using consumers'
perception of risk and behavior on safe food handling and consumption as proxies for
offsetting behavior. A regression was carried out using the risk indexes and food policy
related infomation. This was done using a discrete choice model (Tobit Model). This
regression model was used because it is suitable for latent variables which are most often
truncated and censored (Greene, 2003), perception of risk in this case. Simplified equations
for our empirical model are shown on equations 9 and 10 below:
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OB - f (BH , I)
BH - f (RP) ,
where Bf7 is change in consumer behavior, Zip is risk perception, and J  food safety
information.
Risk Tolerance Index as a Measure of Offsetting Behavior
If consumers' risk tolerance can be described by their response to a particular
question, then that particular question can serve as a proxy for actual food safety risk
tolerance (Brown cf cz/, 2005). It is also possible to build indexes taking into account
responses from numerous scaled items as a compound measure of risk tolerance. The food-
safety risk tolerance measure used in this study is a compound measure that blends several
variables associated with consumers'  food-safety, risk associated perceptions and
behaviors. It is assumed in this study that the value of the indexes reveals consumers'
actual food-safety risk tolerance.
Compound indexes are used in this study due to their peculiar characteristic. They
surmount some of the measurement errors that are intrinsic in single variables as well as
characterizing the various aspects of a concept (Hair ef cz/.,1998). Responses collected after
the survey which was based on the various factors that affect consumers' perception of
food safety risk (including perceived locus of control, personal health influence,
demographics characteristics and outrage) as specified in Nganje ef a/. (2005)
The factor analysis method employed is similar to that camed out by Brown ef a/.
(2005) which tested the consumers' willingness to pay for improved food safety. Here, the
relative risk index of consumers'  food safety perception and the composite measure
containing all four variable categories is arrived at by creating a factor index corresponding
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to each factor of risk perception. This approach used to build up a risk tolerance index
defines "items'. and the "latent" variables" (Brown e/ a/., 2005). Items characterize
component of the scale (e.g. the survey questions). The latent variable, risk tolerance, sets
of item scores and is a principal element that cannot be determined precisely (Devellis,
1991 ). Factor analysis is a statistical approach that entails compressing information
contained in a large number of original variables into a smaller set of measurement
(factors) with a minimal loss of information (Hair cf cz/.,  1992).
Factor analysis investigates whether a number of variables of interest, y`y2,y3___y„ ,
are linearly related to smaller number of unobserved variables, F , F2 , F3___F„ .
The relationship between these variables can be expressed as equations  11  to  14:
Yl -Plo + P„Fl + ®'
Y2 =  Pro +  P2iF2 + td 2
Y3--P3o+PnF3+td3
Yn--Pno+BnJFn+con
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
The error terms  Zzr, , ZZ72 , ZJ3 and  Z7„ from the equations above is an indication that
the hypothesized relationships are not absolute. In the factor analysis literature, the  A
parameters are called factor loadings. Looking at the above equations, it seems that the
loadings can be estimated and therefore the expectations tested by regressing each  y
against each factor. Such an approach is not possible because the generated variables an
unobservable.
Two assumptions are made for the procedure that creates the observation on the  ¥
variables:
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The error terms  ar, are independent of one another and as such the expected value
of the error term  E(zz7, ) = 0  and variance Vcr(z7, ) = cr2 .
The unobservable factors are independent of each other and hence the error terns.
Therefore,E(F)=Oandyczr(F,)=0.
The factor means and the variances are expressed in the standardized form. Since
each observable variable is a linear function of independent factors and error terms, we
have:
Yi -  P ,o +  P `1 + tff `
The variance of each independent variable can be calculated as
prczr(r)=4,:yclr(F,)+prczr(zz7,)
We get
yczr(r ) = 4,:  + zzr,.
(15)
(16)
(17)
The vanance is divided into two parts,
-             ¢,: , the communality, is the par"hat is justified by the common factors, F,..
-             z7,2 , the specific variance is the part of the variance of the independent variable that
is not accounted for by the common factors. If generated factors are absolute
predictors of the independent variable, then zJ,  = ZJ = ZZJ3  = 0 .
The covariance of any two observable variables is calculated as
Y,--P,o+P.\F,+td,+VO;)qjALndY,--plo+Pj.F,+a,+(0)q,
Coy(r,y,)=4tl,4,,yor(F,)+(1XO)yar(zD,)+(OX1)yar(zu,)
-P``P i\.
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The factor loadings are not exclusive; there is an infinite number that gives similar
theoretical variance and covariance.  The principal component method, following Hotelling
(1933) is the most commonly used approach in estimating the first set of factor loadings.
This approach looks for values of the loadings that lead the estimate of the total
communality as closest as possible to the total of the observed variance without taking the
covanance into consideration. The larger the magnitude of the communality, the more
accurately the suggested factors is justified as explaining the independent variables under
consideration. Consider that IV observed variables are given as y , y2 , y3___ y„ . The principal
component analysis approach applies an orthogonal transformation to these observed
variables to give rise to a new set of uncorrelated variables F , F2 , F3___F„ .  These are
chosen in such a way that  F„_, has maximum variance and  Fin,  has maximum variance
subject to been uncorrelated to F„_, .  Let the transformed variables be represented by Fw .
These transfomed vanables are standardized to obtain an updated set which can be
represented by Zw . The fundamental equation in a principal component analysis can be
stated as equation 18:
r=z:I:wzw(I.,w=i,2,.3..„.„), (18)
wherezw  represents the w-/A component and  Pw  is the weight of the w-/fa component in
the I.-/A variable. The principal component analysis is linear, additive, and j.ustified only
when variables in question are measured using similar units of measurement.
Risk Tolerance and the Integration of Food-Safety Risk Information
The risk tolerance index is a representation of how individual subjects' perception
of risk fluctuates. The part played by information in this relationship is necessarily central.
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Consumers' propensity to absorb new information into their risk perception and respond to
it could be related to their risk tolerance. Lui e/ a/. (1998) in their research described
consumers' risk-perception adjustment as a subjective average of risk from previous beliefs
and affirmed risk established on the basis of new information received. Consumers may
gradually change their perceptions when positive information is made available to them
following a contamination. Positive and negative information may perhaps have varying
effects on perceptions (Lui e/ cz/.,1998).
Empirically, consumers ' objective risk perceptions can neither be practically
evaluated nor recuperated from consumption activities (Lui e/ a/.,1998).There is a need to
utilize a suitable evaluation method that can capture such a hidden trend involving a latent
variable like subjects' perception of risk. The Tobit model devised by Tobin (1958) is
suitable model to capture latent variables (e.g., change in individuals' perception). This
model has been used extensively to evaluate to evaluate latent variables such as willingness
to pay (Brown ef a/., 2005), clustered and censored dependent variables such as number of
hours worked (Quester and Greene,  1982), household purchase of durable goods (Tobin,
1958), number of arrests after prison release (Witte,1980) and number of extramarital
affairs (Fair,1977,1978). Conventional regression methods fail to take into account the
qualitative difference between limit (zero) and no limit (continuous) observations (Greene,
2003). This special quality of the Tobit model is the reason for its application in this study
which involves a latent variable (perception of risk).
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The Tobit Model
The stochastic model of the Tobit regression and decomposition from Greene
(2003), Fen and Schmidt (1984) and MCDonald and Moffitt (1980) is represented on
equation  19 to 23.
i,=x,i}+tjl,,         rf  x,i}+ciI,>O
y,=0,                        if     JY,4+aJ,<0 '  =  1,2 ,.......... y
(19)
where  yis the number of variables, y,  is the dependent variable,  Jr,  is a vector of
independent vanables,  4  is a vector of unknown coefficients, and  z7  is an independently
distributed error temi which is assumed to be normal with zero mean and constant
variance a-2 . The Tobit model assumes that there exists an underlying random index which
is observed only when it is positive, as such making it an unobserved latent variable. The
expected value of the dependent variable as indicated from Tobin (1958) is given as
equation 20
E(y)=xpF(z)+qr(z),
where  z = ¥ ,  /(z) represents the unit nomal density and  F(Z) stands for the
Cr
(20)
cumulative normal distribution. The expected values of the dependent variables given that
they are above the limit can be represented as equation 2:
Ef -xp+#)                                                                               (21,
Given the relationship expressed on equation (21 ) above, the connection between expected
value of an entire data set and the expected value given that observations are above the
limit is given in equation (22)
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Ey-F(z)Ei (22)
Looking at the slight change of the expected value of the independent variable on the
expected value of the dependent variable, we arrive at equation (23)
# = F(z(#)+ Ef(#)                                                (23)
The partial derivative from equation 23 indicates that the slight change in the expected
value of the independent variable on the expected value of the dependent variable has two
different p arts.
-             The first part is the change in the dependent variable above the limit, subject to the
probability of it being above the limit.
The second part is the change in the probability of being futher than the limit
subject to the value of the dependent variable when it is above the limit.
To carry out empirical functions with the Tobit model, we assume that the
approximate values for the vector of coefficients  4  and it standard deviation  a-are
known. Every term on equation 23 can be estimated at a particular  X4  value usually at the
mean of the independent variable. The expected value of the dependent variable given that
they are above the limit  E y can be calculated from equation 21  given that the value
off(z)  is obtainable from statistical tables,
Survey Data
The data for this thesis are primary data from a nationwide online survey. It was
conducted using the Zoomerang database. A total of 2,583 respondents participated in the
experiment. Survey questions can be found in Table A1.
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Description of Survey and Data Collection Procedure
All participants involved in the experiment were older than eighteen years of age,
and specified that they eat fresh vegetables a least three times each week. The experiment
involved a cross section of ethnic groups. With approximately 68.22% being whites,
17.89% blacks,10.76% being Hispanics,1.94% Asian, and 1.24% indicating that they
were Native Americans and others, who never indicated their race. A matched sample
design was utilized so as to get rid of the variation between samples as a source of
sampling error. Subjects were therefore asked a particular question thrice about their
preparation style preference for vegetables and their perception of risk, at a two weeks
interval.
Questiormaires included questions on factors that influence an individuals'
perception of risk, the four categories involved are: locus of control (measures taken to
mitigate the risk of consumption by consumers of producers), personal health characteristic
(includes age, source of obtaining food safety information, and experience of food bone
illness), outrage (fear of the unknown) and demographic characteristic (education and
ethnicity). In the initial experiment, the questiormaire was structured in a manner such that
no specific allusion was made for food safety. The second experiment involved the
provision of negative food safety information to respondents. The third and final
experiment involved giving the respondents positive food-safety information. Positive and
negative infomation given to the respondents was obtained from newsletter articles, an
efficient source of food-safety information. Food-safety related information provided to
subjects is found in Table A2.
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Risk Index and Perception of Risk
If the risk tolerance index reflects consumers' true valuation, then individuals can
be generally described as risk averse and risk takers. Risk-adverse consumers are those
who are skeptical about policies put in place to prevent the contamination of food by
foodbome pathogens and other toxic materials. They are willing to take additional
precautionary measures in the preparation and handling of their food. Risk takers are those
who believe that the food supply is free from foodbome pathogens and, therefore, do not
take any additional preventive measures in the handling and preparation of their food. The
risk tolerance index is, thus, a reflection of individuals'  food-safety perception.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Estimation of Risk Tolerance Index Using Factor Analysis
A total of three experiments were conducted.   Factor analysis was used to create a
risk tolerance index for the four factors that influence consumers' perception of risk based
on available food safety information. Based on the factor analysis, the questions that had
significant contribution going by the factor loadings are presented on Table 4.1.
The locus of control factor includes variables associated with questions,16,17, and  19 (Q
16, Q17, and Q19). Personal health influence is associated with question 28 (Q28). The
outrage factor is linked with question 31  (Q31 ).
Table 4.1 : Factor Loadings and Factor Score Coefficients for Loaded Questions.
Variables Factor Loadings Scorecoefricients
Q16 .744 .634
Q17 .752 .580
Q19 .500 .403
Q28 .644 .476
Q3l .547 .436
*Description of variables can be found in Table A1.
Locus of control involves all actions and measures taken along various stages of the
food supply chain to enhance the safety of food in this case vegetables (spinach). An
example is the implementation of mandatory HACCP at the farm, retail and processing
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level. If consumers believe the locus of control in vegetable production is weak, their
perception of risk for vegetables will be high. They will regard vegetables as less safe and
will therefore forgo or limit their consumption. This led us to suggest that the locus of
control factor in our analysis will have an inverse relationship with perception of risk.
The second factor health influence describes if a consumer has had any past
experience of illness from the consumption of vegetables or if any close family members or
friends have fallen sick from vegetable consumption. We expect the health influence with
the reception of positive food safety information to have an inverse relationship with the
perception of risk. A bad health influence in a normal situation would lead to an increased
perception of risk, however positive food safety information might change consumers'
perception leading to an inverse relationship.
The third factor, outrage is simply defined as the fear of the unknown. Consumers
will consume more of a product they are familiar with than go for what they are unfamiliar
with. The expectation here is that as consumers get positive food safety infomation from
policy implementation; they become more tolerant consuming other vegetable (e.g. brands)
which they did not consume before. We expect an inverse relationship between perception
of risk and outrage. If such an inverse relationship is obtainable from our analysis then we
shall proceed to conclude that offsetting behavior exist in vegetable preparation and
consumption. The mean responses and standard deviations of loaded question according to
their categories are presented in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Means and Standard Deviations for Loaded Questions According to Category.
No Information Negative Positive
Information Information
Categones Variables Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation Deviation
Locus of Q16 2.311 I.047 2.295 1.041 2.262 I.054
Control Q17 2.315 0.7831.311 2.299 0.775 2.304 0,783
Ql9 1.984 1.990 I.300 2.072 1.358
PersonalHealthinfluence Q28 3.187 .911 3.199 0.886 3.075 0.888
Outrage Q31 1.057 0.256 1.070 0.274 1.060 0.265
Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Analysis
To access if there is any alteration in subjects' preparation style for our strategic
variables, we went further to calculate the means and variances for perception of risk and
preparation style preference. Table 4.3  shows the results for the change in mean values for
subjects' preparation style preference or convenience and their perception of risk.
Following from Table 4.3, the mean values of the preparation style preference for
spinach vary for the three different information stages of the experiment. It decreases from
2.315 (when no mention of food safety is made) to 2.299 (as negative information on
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outbreaks and impact of I.  co/z' 0157 is provided) then increases slightly to 2.304 (when
positive infomation from HACCP is made available).
Table 4.3 : Change in Mean of preparation Style Preference and Perception of Risk
No Information Negative Positive
Information Information
Variable Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation Deviation
Preparationstylepreference(Q17) 2.315 0.783 2.299 0.775 2.304 0.784
Consuners'perception.(Q18) 1.680 0.016 0.693 0.024 i.631 0.025
The mean values of consumers perception of risk about the spinach they consume
varies significantly with the change in information stages. It decreases from  I.680 (with no
information) to a low of 0.693 (with negative infomation on outbreaks and the
consequences ofE. co/I. 0157: H7) and then increases considerably to  1.631  (with the
provision of positive information from PR/HACCP).
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With the change in means of preparation style preference and perception observed
across infomation stages observed above, there is need to statistically test whether the
changes observed in subj ects risk tolerance are statistically significant. Two hypotheses are
tested in line witb the data from the three different experiments. Analysis of variance
(ANOVA) method, a step up from the t-test can help determine if two or more samples
have the same mean or average. The null hypothesis is that the mean perception consumers
have for spinach when information concerning the possible effect of the fatal E.  co/I. 0157:
H7 that is found in spinach and when additional information vis-a-vis positive development
in food safety due to implementation of pR/HACCP has been made accessible to subjects
are equal.
When Consumers Are Given Negative Food-Safety Information
Table 4.4 represents the ANOVA results comparing the change in consumers' mean
perception for the no information and the negative information stages.
The null hypothesis advanced is rejected at the 1% level of significance with a p-
value of 7.5E-216. In line with the result above, there is therefore enough evidence to
suggest that no infomation and the negative information stages of the experiment have
means that are statistically different from each other. Consumers' perception therefore
changes when negative information about the impact of consuming spinach contaminated
with E. co/z. 0157:H7 is given to them. In a similar manner, we test the second null
hypothesis that the mean values of negative food safety information from effect of the
lethal E. co/I. 0157:H7 and that for positive infomation from PR/HACCP are equal. Table
4.5 shows ANOVA result for the hypothesis test between negative and positive infomation
stages.
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Table 4.4: Hypothesis Test Results for the No and Negative Information Stages
ANOVA
Source ofVariation SS DF MS F P-Value F-Critical
BetweenGroups 686.628 1 686.628 1176.841 0.000 3.845
WithinGroups 1645.33 2820 0.584
Total 2331.957 2821
When Consumers Are Given Positive Food-Safety Information
Table 4.5 represents the ANOVA analysis results companng the variation in
consumers' mean perception from the negative to the positive information stages. Here
also, the null hypothesis was rejected at the  1 % level of significance with a p-value of
0.000. There is enough evidence to suggest that both negative and positive infomation
stages have means that are statistically different from each other. This also implies that
subjects adjust their perception as soon as information on the positive effect of pR/HACCP
is given to them.
Table 4.5: Hypothesis Test Results for the Negative and Positive Information Stages
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ANOVA
Source ofVariation SS DF MS F P-value F-Critical
BetweenGroups 363.046 1 363.046 531.039 0.000 6.648
WithinGroups 1361.835 1992 0.684
Total 1724.881 1993
The analysis of variance results suggest that consumers' became less vigilant in
light with the hazard of E. co/i. 0157 :H7 because of their perception that a greater part of
the threat from pathogens in spinach was mitigated by the implementation of pR/HACCP.
The above results are in accordance with Onyango c/ a/. (2007) who after the 2006
nationwide spinach recalls found that consumers have complete trust in government actions
and engagement with regards to food safety issues. Holistically, these results suggest the
presence of offsetting behavior where a food safety policy is enacted to decrease the
number of possible victims' contamination from E.  co/z. 0157 and other bacteria which
cause food poisoning. Here offsetting behavior is shown in the consumers'  lessened care in
the face of articulated policy. Food safety fears fade away because of policies put in place
and as such the function played by consumers ' level of alertness in preparation of spinach
declines while secondary characteristics become their preoccupation.
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To evaluate whether the offsetting behavior is dominant or partial, we need further
analysis for elucidation. Dominant offsetting behavior in this light would signify that the
marginal effect of information concerning the positive HACCP policy impact leads
subjects' preparation style preference for spinach to rise to at least the level before any
information on food safety was made available. Marginal benefit analysis will help us
deduce whether the offsetting behavior is dominant or partial. For marginal benefit
analysis, two Tobit regressions were carried out to test the hypothesis that dominant
offsetting behavior may be what is obtainable from subjects' reaction to food safety
information.
Risk Tolerance Index and Offsetting Behavior
The results for the model with the three risk tolerance indexes factors and the
dummy variables representing the general (no information) and the negative information
experiments are as shown in Table 4.6. Results indicate that the dummy variables which
represent the two information stages Dl  and D2 are statistically significant at the  1% level
of significance. This goes to confirm the important role information plays in our evaluation
of offsetting behavior. Outrage is significant at the 5% level. A reduction in the number of
times spinach is consumed in a week leads to lowered perception of risk with no
information and negative food safety information` The personal health influence is
significant at  10%. This suggest contrary to expectations that the higher the age of a
consumer, the higher their perception of risk. Thus as subjects grow older, they become
more cautious about how they prepare and consume their vegetables. Increased age will
mean a greater risk of getting sick from the consuming contaminated vegetables, a possible
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reason why older consumers are more careful in the way they prepare and consume their
vegetables.
Table 4.6: Summary of Tobit Regression Regarding the Offsetting Behavior
Variables Coefricients Marginal Effect
Factor 1 : Locus of control -0.033*(0.019) -0.030*
Factor 2: Personal Health 0.031 * 0.029*
Influence (0.019)
Factor 3 :  Outrage -0.049***(0.019) -0.045***
D1 1.682***(0.026) 1.528***
D2 1.666***(0.040) 1.514***
Sigma 0.974***(0.014)
*** and * denote significance at  I % and  10%, respectively.
Offsetting Behavior and the Benefits of Food-Safety Information
Information  interaction  terms  are  introduced  for  the  variables  that  are  directly
related  to  consumers'  behavior  (outrage  and  locus  of control)  so  as  to  carry  out  further
evaluations.  Results  for this analysis  are presented on Table 4.7.  The quadratic interaction
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term between locus of control, outrage and the infomation stages is evaluated. As with the
former regression, the information stage variables are significant at the  1% level showing
that the  information stages play  a vital  role in our evaluation of offsetting behavior.  The
magnitude  and  the  sign  of the  personal  health  influence  are  consistent  with  the  former
results. It is significant at the 10% level. This further confims the fact that as subjects grow
older, they remained cautious despite the reception of positive food safety information.
The coefficient of the first quadratic interaction term locus of control* Infomation
stage is negative and significant at the  10% level. When positive information from food
policy is given to subjects, the probability of consuming well prepared spinach decreases
noticeably. High risk attributes like the origin, and other characteristics (bagged, already
cut or frozen) are no longer considered consumers.
The second interaction term Outrage* Information stage is negative and significant
at the 1% level. The negative signs on these variables go to confirm the presence of
offsetting behavior. As positive information from policies reaches consumers, the
possibility of choosing spinach with characteristics that present a lower risk of
contamination diminishes conspicuously confirming, the presence of offsetting behavior in
food safety.
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Table 4.7: Summary of Tobit Regression Regarding the Change in Information Stage
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect
Factor 2: 0.031 * 0.029*
Personal Health Influence (0.019)
Locus of Control * -0.017* -0.016*
Infomation Stage (0.010)
Outrage*            Information -0.034*** -0.030***
Stage (0.010)
Dl 1.681***(0.026) 1.528***
D2 1.665***(0.040) 1.514***
Sigma 0.973***(0.014)
***, **, and * denote significance at  1%, 5%, and  10%, respectively.
The marginal effects results shown in Table 4.7 indicate that the marginal increase
in positive food safety information will reduce the likelihood of consuming spinach with
safe attributes and the frequency of consuming spinach per week by I.57% and 3.04%
correspondingly with regards to locus of control and outrage. Intuitively, these results
indicate that positive infomation that affects two of the factors in the risk tolerance that are
under the control of a consumer (locus of control and outrage) can lead to dominant
offsetting behavior in response to food safety policy. This is obtainable given that the
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consequence of marginal changes in food policy information is a more than balanced
variation in consumers' risk perception hence behavior. The above results concur with
theoretical results presented by Hause (2006), and lend a hand to the fact that various
media outlets (e.g., newspapers, newsletters, the television and radio) are able to change
consumers' perception of risk and hence the outcome of food safety policies on the basis of
the information conveyed about foodborne illnesses and policies put in place for their
mitigation.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Food-safety risk tolerance index and food-safety policy information from food
safety regulations affect consumers' perception of risk. Construction of food safety risk
tolerance indexes facilitated the examination of the relationship between risk tolerance
indexes and subjects perception of risk. Food safety tolerance indexes were created from
survey questions based on the factors that affect individuals' perception of risk following
Nganje e/ cz/. (2003). Data for this involved an online survey carned out using the
zoomerang database. The food safety perception of risk related questions which enabled
the construction of the risk tolerance were collected for the No Information, Negative
Information, and Positive Information stages. Factor analysis was used to create factor
scores and loadings. From the factor loadings of the factor analysis results, it was found
out that three out the four factors that affect consumers' perception of risk had significant
enough contribution to fit into our analysis. These three factors were locus of control,
personal health influence and outrage. The demographic factor did not have sufficient
contribution and hence it was dropped. Factors scores were used as an indication of how
variables contribute to the explanation of the common underlying factor. The next step was
to access how these risk tolerance indexes affect subjects' perception of risk.
Negative information involved the health impact of consuming vegetables
contaminated with the fatal E. co/!. 0157. Positive information involved the positive trends
in food safety. A preliminary analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out to evaluate
the hypothesis that the means between the different information stages are the sane. The
results rejected the null hypothesis of equality in means between the No Information and
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Negative Information stages and between the Negative information and Positive
Information stages. This one factor (ANOVA) analyses provide us with evidence that there
is a statistically significant change in subjects' perception of risk when infomation about
the deadly E. co/i and positive trend in food safety is given to them. Given these results, we
went further to exam to what extent or the degree to which the risk tolerance indexes affect
consumers' perception of risk. To do this, we used a Tobit regression since our dependent
variable qualifies as a latent variable.
From our analysis it was found that as consumers get older given no information
and negative information their likelihood of choosing to consume safe spinach increase by
2.850/o. There is the possibility that older consumers have gathered experience from the
past which enhances their consumption habits and the conviction of the safety they place
on the vegetables they consume. The variables which are under the control of consumers
increase the possibility of consuming contaminated spinach. Locus of control and outrage
will decrease the prospect of consumers eating safer spinach by 2.98% and 4.48%
respectively. Possible indications for this is that when consumers are aware of the source of
their spinach or have extra information on the treatment of the spinach they consume (e.g.,
if they were washed, sorted, canned or frozen), they are likely to become more negligent
concerning food-safety and are more inclined to consuming unsafe spinach.
The quadratic interaction between the risk factors that are under the control of
consumers that is locus of control*food-safety information and outrage*food-safety
informatioil remained unchanged in terms of their signs. Changes were however noticed in
the levels of significance. The personal health influence factor remalns significant at the
10% level of significance and the sign of the coefficient also remains positive. This goes to
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further confirm the fact that as consumers become older they are more cautious about
positive information from policy. A possible reason could be that given their experience
gathered over the years and their susceptible to food bone illness, older consumers are
more cautious in their assimilation of information and hence the way they prepare their
spinach. These results also suggest that marginal increase in the positive effect of
PR/HACCP decrease the potential of subjects consuming safe spinach by 1.58% and 3.04%
for locus of control and outrage correspondingly. It is also worthy of notice here that
demographic factors such as ethnicity, education and income were not included in the
model.
The preliminary analysis of variance (ANOVA) results carried out which indicated
the change in consumers mean perception of risk from the different information stages
coupled with the Tobit regression results validate the presence of offsetting behavior  in the
preparation and consumption of vegetable. Dominant offsetting behavior is associated to
the risk tolerant indexes directly related to locus of control and outrage. These variables
that are under the control of consumers may cause dominant offsetting behavior due to
marginal changes in policy information resulting to a more than equal change in
consumers' perception of risk and behavior.
Policy Implication and Suggestion
Given the increase in the number of recalls, outbreaks, contaminations, and deaths
associated with the consumption of vegetable witnessed in recent years despite voluntary
measures undertaken by some producers (voluntary HACCP), there is concern that existing
agricultural practices in the vegetable sector have not been effective in preventing E. co/I.
illnesses. Due to the sporadic and roughly distributed nature of microbial contamination of
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vegetable, there have been calls emphasizing the necessity for the establishment of
mandatory good agricultural practices (GAP) or more scientific methods (like the widely
recognized and tested PR/HACCP) in the vegetable sector. This method of ensuring food
safety is suggested because it provides evidence of how and where contamination is most
likely to occur. Some of these above mentioned methods are presently implemented as
voluntary pathogen mitigation approaches. Other groups are highly in favor of self-
regulation putting forward the argument that the mandatory regulatory method will be too
costly for smaller producers and could therefore bear heavily on them financially.
Seemingly, there seems to be an agreement towards mandatory policy implementation
given recent outbreaks.
Our findings show the presence of offsetting behavior in the preparation and
consumption of spinach given that a mandatory policy like PR/HACCP is implemented in
the vegetable sector. Such a move carries with it significant policy implications. We will
therefore proceed to make clear the policy implications of our findings. Hause (2006)
stresses the fact that the ultimate effect of policy is an empirical suttject. He also pointed
out that the welfare inference of offsetting behavior relies malnly on whether the decline in
victims' accident avoidance expenditure is considered a social gain or not. With this in
mind, an efficient analysis of the impact of a safety policy on expected accident loss and
accident rates necessarily needs to take into consideration the effects of offsetting behavior
whenever it is significant. This study blends together the theoretical and empirical analysis
to expand the offsetting behavior literature to examine the marginal benefits of food safety
policies
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This study points to the fact that in perspective of the push towards a mandatory
policy in the vegetable sector, offsetting behavior should be taken into account before the
impact of the regulation can be stated. Failure to do so will lead to exaggeration of policy
impact and hence mislead consumers further compromising their health.  Offsetting
behavior should be taken into account, such as to enhance accountability of enforced food
safety policies and regulations. Further research would be to evaluate the beneflts and costs
of food-safety policies with the incorporation of offsetting behavior.
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